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Abstract
Both the equilibrium interest rate and the equity premium, as well
as risk premiums of risky investments are all important quantities in
cost-benefit analyses. In the light of the current (2008 -) financial
crisis, it is of interest to study models that connect the the financial
sector with the real economy. The effects of climate change has, on
the other hand, been the subject of extensive discussions, for example
in connection with the Stern report. The paper addresses both these
issues, first based on standard assumptions. In particular we investi-
gate what is needed to have long-term interests lower than short term
rates. Our model allows us to tell what happens to risk premiums
in turbulent times, consistent with observations. Next we extend the
pure exchange model to a production economy. As a result we obtain
an equilibrium term structure of interest rates, as well as a model for
the equity premium. We end by a discussion of risk adjustments of the
discount factor. For projects aimed at insuring future consumption,
the interest rate is smaller than the risk free rate. Mitigation can have
the characteristics of such a project.
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1 Introduction
Starting with an the exchange economy, the short term interest rate rt is de-
termined in equilibrium, and represents the certain rate of return an investor
at time t can secure on an investment between t and t + 1. The value of
rt+1 is, on the other hand random as seen from time t on. Thus the risk-free
interest rate {rt, t = 0, 1, 2, · · · } is really an adapted stochastic process. In
contrast, if the investment is uncertain, like the return on a common stock,
the corresponding return Rt is a random variable.
From dynamic equilibrium theory it follows that the real short rate is
given by rt = −µpi(t)/pi(t) in a continuous-time framework, i.e., as the
exponential rate of decline of the representative agent’s marginal utility.
Here pi(t) are the Arrow-Debreu state prices at time t, which are given by
pi(t) = u′(ct, t), where u(·, t) is the representative agent’s utility index, and
ct is the aggregate consumption of nondurables and services in the economy
at time t. Provided that u is of additive and separable form, and aggregate
consumption is a geometric Brownian motion1, a standard formula for the
equilibrium real short rate is given by
r = ρ+ γ
(
g − 1
2
(1 + γ)σ2
)
. (1)
Here g is the conditional expected growth rate in aggregate consumption,
ρ is the subjective rate, part of the preferences of the representative agent,
γ−1 is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption, (1 + γ) is
relative prudence of the representative agent, and σ2 is the variance rate of
the consumption growth rate. 2
The canonical model does not assume any time dependence of these pa-
rameters, but there are of course no good reasons for this, except perhaps
parsimony, and we will shall have more to say about this below.
For projects with a non-random payoff, along the optimal consumption
path it is correct to accept projects with a positive present value provided
future consumption gains are discounted according to (1). More precisely,
the discount factor at time t for consumption at time T > t in the future
is given by Λt,T =
1
u′(ct,t)Et{u′(cT , T )} = e−r(T−t) under the above stipulated
conditions, where r is given by (1). This is also the equilibrium price at time
t of a zero coupon government bond paying one unit of the consumption good
at at time T .
1This means that dctct = gdt+ σdBt, where Bt is a standard Brownian motion.
2When the reprentative consumer has utility index u(c, t) = c
1−γ
1−γ e
−ρt, the consumption
elasticity is − u′(ct)u′′(ct)ct = γ−1 and relative prudence is defined as −
u′′′(ct)ct
u′′(ct)
= (1 + γ).
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In the classical Ramsey model, consumption is assumed deterministic,
and the last term in formula (1) disappears. This formula was used by, i.a.,
Leif Johansen during the 1960s in connection with public projects in post-
war Norway (Johansen (1967)). Typical values for the interest rate were 5 or
7 per cent, depending upon whether the estimate for the per capita growth
rate was 2 or 3 per cent. The values of γ = 2 and ρ = 0.01 were typically
used.
The magnitude of the interest rate is a central parameter in all cost-
benefit analyses. In particular for projects of long durations will the value of
r play an important role in determining whether a project is profitable or not.
In the public sector examples are investments in infrastructure in the trans-
portation sector, investments in energy production, and investments geared
at mitigating the adverse effects from climate change and other environmen-
tal changes. In such cases one needs an educated opinion about the interest
rate during the next 20 to 30 years, while in climate and environmental pol-
icy it seems to be relatively broad consensus that the most severe damages
resulting from climate changes will occur after year 2100.
During the last decade we have seen several numerical analyses of opti-
mal climate policy. The studies are based on ”Integrated assessment models”
connecting models of climate change to traditional applied economic mod-
els. Perhaps the best known of these models are the DICE/RICE models
developed by William Nordhaus (see Nordhaus (1994), (2008)). In the last
DICE-version the value of the interest used is 4.1 per cent. This gives a
strong discounting of costs/benefits in the distant future: One billion dollars
in 200 years is then worth 274 700 dollars today. Accordingly, the the op-
timal mitigations are moderate, giving an expected global warming by the
year 2200 of 3.5 degrees centigrade, while the expected global warming with
”business as usual” is estimated to 5.3 degrees centigrade.
The Stern report (Stern (2007)) recommends a more dramatic mitigation
policy, and an important assumption behind the analysis is an interest rate
r of only 1.4 per cent, which is much lower than is usually employed. An
additional important assumption is that the utility index of the representative
agent can only be ”moderately concave”, giving a low value of γ. In addition
the impatience rate ρ is set to zero.
Stern’s analysis rests upon a utilitarian calculus that is standard in ap-
plied economics; each person, whether alive or yet to be born, counts as
equal, except that giving the same benefit to someone who is rich counts as
less valuable than giving it to someone who is poor.
The standard optimal consumption and investment theory is, perhaps,
not tailor-made for climate problems. In this theory the investments usually
benefit the generation who makes them, in addition to future generations,
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whereas in climate related problems, the investments made today will only
benefit generations far into the future.
With an expected per capita growth of 1.1-1.2 per cent in a 200 year per-
spective, as assumed in the Stern report, it has been argued that mitigation
will not be a natural conclusion for any positive real interest rate, no matter
how small, so long as the utility function displays decreasing marginal utility
in wealth. This argument is at the best meaningful if the growth rate does
not vary much. However if interpreted as some average growth rate over this
time horizon, mitigation could still follow, provided the growth rate becomes
low, and perhaps negative, at long horizons. If not, the transfer from the
poor to the rich that would be implicit in reducing carbon emissions is the
following: We, the current generation, are the poor who are to make sacri-
fices for the future generations, who are likely to be much wealthier than we
are. They will be the beneficiaries of our sacrifices. And so, based on the
utilitarian calculus, egalitarians should be opposed to curbs on carbon.
Another related example is the public revenues from the petroleum sec-
tor in Norway that has been invested abroad in the ”Norwegian Petroleum
Fund”, now termed the ”Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global”. 3
This fund owns close to 1% of the world’s available stocks, and by the end
of 2008 had investments of 150 billion US dollars in 55 countries spread over
7366 companies. The rationale for doing so that has been put forward is (a)
the future generations should get their fair share of these revenues, and (b)
demographic factors of an ever aging population makes it important to have
a fund based pension system rather than a pay as you go scheme, which is
the current practice. There are also other issues, among them that all these
revenues can not be investments in infrastructure in Norway, in fear of infla-
tion. The time perspective is unclear, but let us say around 50 to 70 years, in
other words shorter than for climate problems. Again the utilitarian calcu-
lus combined with a forecast of a per capita annual growth rate in aggregate
consumption of around 1.5− 2.0 per cent would give the conclusion that the
establishment of such a fund, whatever its name, may be hard to defend.
In addition come the incentive problems of state employees (the agents)
investing in speculative markets on behalf of future generations (the princi-
pals), and the discretion vs rules problems of politicians controlling such a
fund. Regarding the latter, in the end it is the politicians who determine
the use of the fund. So far there have been significant deviations from the
self-imposed rule of extracting only the real rate, estimated to 4%, each year.
A fund exclusively for future generations may be consistent with the ’util-
itarian’ point of view if at least one of the following holds: Either the utility
3There are several similar funds in other nations.
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function must be basically linear, so that γ ≈ 0, or the annual per capita
consumption growth rate g must eventually become negative. Concerning
the value of γ, a typical participant in the stock market is often estimated
to have a relative risk aversion around 2, or perhaps larger, and accounting
for those who are not participating presumably because they are even more
risk averse, the representative agent ought to have risk aversion above 2. It
so happens that this relative risk aversion equals the inverse of the elastic-
ity of intertemporal substitution in consumption in the standard model, in
other words it equals γ. Weil (1989) found a value of this elasticity of near
10% to be appropriate. In all, γ > 2 is a fairly safe choice. Concerning the
parameter g, one may think that an estimate of a positive growth rate of
this magnitude is rather conservative, at least for a time horizon of 50 to 70
years. The increased productivity is expected to outweigh the fact that there
will be relatively fewer persons in the work force relative to the population
at large. In view of this, the argument in (b) is largely neutralized.
If this growth rate is time varying, on the other hand, and negative to-
wards the end of the oil and gas producing period, the fund will still be con-
sistent with the ’utilitarian’ point of view, perhaps combined with a lower
extraction rate.
In this paper we take the view that a proper use of the standard model,
and its extensions, is adequate. It prescribes, in a utilitarian framework,
the optimal consumption and the optimal investment policy in society. The
expression (1) gives the equilibrium interest rate at which savings should take
place, or the correct return to require on a project that is uncorrelated with
equity. The model prescribes an optimal consumption rate in society, as well
as an optimal investment policy. These models do not, however, take into
account the possible negative relationship between consumption growth and
climate problems. When it comes to the Norwegian Government Pension
Fund Global, the economic rationale for it may be sound, so long as the real
return is used for investments and consumption in Norway.
The Stern-report and other analyses of climate problems have been the
subjects of considerable debate. An important issue has been the value of the
interest rate in analyses with a very long time horizon. An important topic is
then if one should use a time varying interest rate. Instead of focusing solely
on the interest rate, one is led to study the discount factor. This leads us to
incorporate market data in order to estimate the term structure of interest
rates. Also, one is inevitably led to consider risky projects in the private
sector. There seems to be fairly broad consensus that such information is
relevant for investment projects in the public sector with durations up to 30
years. It is less obvious that there is available reliable data from the private
sector that can be used to find the present value of quantities more that 50
5
years into the future.
One obvious omission in these analyses is that the heterogeneity between
nations of the world is not taken into account. Including this would raise a
host of new questions, well beyond the scope of the present presentation. 4
In Section 2 we discuss time variations in the interest rate. In Section 3
we calibrate the uncertainty about the future, inherent in the Stern Review,
to the standard pure exchange equilibrium model of Lucas (1978). Here we
extend this model to allow for sudden shocks at random points in time, and
demonstrate that this feature of the model may explain lower future interest
rates, and higher risk premiums.
In Section 4 we bring in term structure models. It turns out that such
models offer the right framework for some of the questions we are interested
in. Sections 5 and 6 treat risk premiums, in particular the premium on equity,
and what we can say from data in the private sector about the discount
factors. Here we indicate what the model has to say about risk premium
changes related to the current (2008 -) financial crisis.
In Section 7 we address the issue of risk adjustments of projects directed
towards mitigation of the adverse effects from climate changes. With respect
to climate problems, imagine a ’project’ that does not pay off if the future
state of the climate is good, and gives a positive return if the future climate is
in a bad state. Such a project has the effects of smoothing consumption across
time. With reference to an insurance setting, such a project is associated with
a negative correlation with aggregate consumption, and will therefore result
in a negative risk premium in equilibrium. The appropriate discount rate
for discounting the future related to projects of this nature would be smaller
than the risk free rate rt. In other words, while a project that contributes
positively to aggregate consumption is penalized with higher discounting, a
project that works as an insurance of future consumption is ’rewarded’ by
lower discounting.
It is argued that mitigation has the properties of pooling across states/time,
and has an associated return that can be negatively correlated with aggregate
consumption.
4According to Der Spiegel of 18.10-2010 Angela Merkel and Nikolas Sarkozy pick up
the challenge and establish a think tank of experts to analyze just these questions.
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2 Time variations of the equilibrium interest
rate
In may be useful to recall the basic principles behind the analysis to follow.
In the standard exchange model there is a set of m agents characterized
by endowment processes ei and utility functions Ui. The agents can trade
in a securities market consisting of N risky, and one risk free asset. The
objective is to use this market for investments such that the utility of life
time consumption is optimized. Provided a representative agent equilibrium
exists, the short term interest rate rt as well as risk premiums on the risky
assets can be determined under various assumptions. For example, when (i)
the aggregate endowment process c =
∑
i e
i has dynamics
dc(t)
c(t)
= g(t)dt+ σc(t)dB(t), (2)
where B is a Brownian motion, g(t) is the conditional expected growth rate at
time t, and σc(t)
2 is the conditional variance of the growth rate of aggregate
consumption, and (ii) the utility function Uλ(·) of the representative agent,
where λ = (λ1, · · · , λm) signify the agent weights, has the form
Uλ(c) = E
(∫ T
0
uλ(ct, t)dt
)
,
then the risk free interest rate is given by (uλ = u)
r(t) = −
∂
∂t
u′(ct, t)
u′(ct, t)
+
(
−u
′′(ct)ct
u′(ct)
)
g(t)− 1
2
u′′′(ct)
u′(ct)
c(t)2σc(t) · σc(t), (3)
and the equilibrium risk premium of any risky security having return rate
µR(t) at time t is
µR(t)− rt =
(
−u
′′(ct, t)ct
u′(ct, t)
)
σR(t)σc(t). (4)
The optimal consumption cit of agent i at time t is given by
cit = u
′−1
i (λ
−1
i u
′(ct, t), t),
where u′−1i (·, t) inverts the marginal utility function u′i(·, t). The state price
pit at time t is pit = u
′
λ(ct, t). By market clearing, the optimal consumption in
society equals the aggregate endowment c in this ’fruit-tree’ economy. This
result tells us the optimal consumption of individual i at any time t is a
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non-decreasing function of aggregate consumption. This we will later refer
to as the mutuality principle.
First we focus on the short rate r. We assume that the felicity index can
be represented as u(ct, t) = e
− R t0 ρ(s) dsu(ct). As a consequence
ρ(t) = −
∂
∂t
u′(ct, t)
u′(ct, t)
,
where ρ(t) is interpreted as the subjective rate at time t. Furthermore we
denote by
γ(t) = −u
′′(ct)ct
u′(ct)
,
the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption at
time t. γ(t) is also the relative risk aversion of the representative agent.
Some economists have recently argued for a falling interest rate in the
long run (e.g., Weitzman (2007) and Gollier et.al. (2008). This has motivated
other researchers (e.g., Dalen et. al. (2006)) to allow the quantities in (1) to
be deterministic functions of time. In the standard formula for the interest
rate given in (1) all the quantities are constants (σc = σ).
In the above, if we further make the assumption that
u(x, t) =
1
1− γ(t)x
1−γ(t)e−
R t
0 ρ(s) ds, (5)
the resulting equilibrium interest rate model takes the form
r(t) = ρ(t) + γ(t)
(
g(t)− 1
2
(1 + γ(t))σ2c (t)
)
. (6)
Provided g and σc are not state dependent, the parameters in (1) are now
seen to be deterministic functions of time.
Notice that u(ct, t) is not state and time separable, due to the somewhat
unusual assumption (5) that the parameter γ is time dependent. We shall
return to this assumption below, where we also discuss the time dependency
in the other terms as well.
First observe that the discount factor Λt,T is given by
Λt,T =
{
e−
R T
t r(s)ds, if γ is a constant;
e−
R T
t r˜(s)dsc
(γ(t)−γ(T ))
t , if γ = γ(t) is time varying.
(7)
where r˜(s) = ρ(s) + γ(T )(g(s) + 1
2
σ2(s)(1 + γ(T )). The expression for the
term structure is simpler and has a more intuitive form when γ is a constant.
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When this parameter varies with time, the discount factor becomes state
dependent even if none of the parameters are. It is not obvious in which
direction changes within and between generations would affect γ. In some
studies it is found that γ(t) is lower the higher the consumption, with 1 as a
lower boundary (Dagsvik, Jia and Strøm (2006)).
If the per capita growth rate in GNP is positive, meaning that future
generations become wealthier, then (γ(t)− γ(T )) > 0 is consistent with this
observation, in which case the discount function tends to be larger when γ(t)
is time varying, meaning that future benefits are not as heavily discounted
as when γ is a constant, provided the last term in (6) is not too big, and
assuming ct > 1. In this case we also see that the equilibrium interest rate
r(t) decreases when γ(t) decreases.
In the case where the growth rate g(t) and the volatility σ(t) are random
processes, the subjective rate ρ(t) is a deterministic function of time, and γ
is a constant, by use of the stochastic exponential the discount factor is given
by the conditional expectation
Λt,T = Et
(
e−
R T
t r(s)ds
)
, (8)
where the interest rate r(s, ω) = ρ(s)+γ(g(s, ω)+ 1
2
σ2(s, ω)(1+γ)) in equilib-
rium, and where ω signifies state dependence. Notice that the market price
of risk is zero in this situation.
Returning to the interest rate given in (6), the effects from an increase
in γ−1(t), the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption, is as
expected. As the substitution effect increases, the representative agent wants
to save. Since this is impossible, the interest rate must fall to restore equi-
librium. Because of this effect the value of γ = 1 becomes a border case.
For values of γ > 1 the wealth effect will dominate, while for γ < 1 the sub-
stitution effect dominates. It would of course be of interest to separate the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution from being just the reciprocal of the
relative risk aversion, and there are other models of preferences that accom-
modate this, like recursive utility, Epstein-Zin utitliy, habit formation etc.,
but we shall not discuss these any further here.
There is no fundamental issue with allowing γ to be time dependent,
aside from the practical problem encountered with (7). In a recent paper
(Aase (2009)), it is shown that allowing this time dependence can be used
to explain that the the optimal investment strategy of an individual is to
reduce the exposure to equity as the investor becomes older. This effect
follows if the individual’s risk aversion is an increasing function of time.
This behavior is consistent with empirical evidence, but does not follow from
the canonical investment model. This may ultimately lead to the topic of
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a wealth dependent γ, but there is no definitive argument for or against
decreasing relative risk aversion in wealth.
Regarding the parameter ρ, allowing the impatience rate to be time de-
pendent introduces time inconsistency since discounting is no longer expo-
nential, which may be viewed as reflecting an irrationality (see e.g., Johnsen
and Donaldson (1985)). Consider a person who prefers to receive two apples
in one year plus one day rather than one apple in one year, but prefers to
receive one apple today rather than two apples tomorrow (Thaler (1981)).
This person is decreasingly impatient. If his preferences between ”today”
and ”tomorrow” remain the same for one year, and he resets the clock to
zero whenever he makes a decision, then in one year from now he will prefer
to receive one apple on that day rather than two apples one day later. Thus,
his preferences between the two options will have changed over time.
Based on the above, we will assume that the subjective rate ρ is a constant
through time. The same assumption is made for the parameter γ.
Two effects are of particular importance when discussing the equilibrium
interest rate. One is the wealth effect, the other the precautionary effect.
If the future growth rate increases, then the future interest rate increases,
ceteris paribus. This is the wealth effect and leads to a higher discounting of
future consumption benefits. The yield curve R(t, T ), often called the term
structure of interest rates, is defined by
Λt,T = e
−R(t,T )(T−t),
or
R(t, T ) = − ln Λt,T
T − t , (9)
so that R(t, T ) is the average, annual interest in the time interval [t, T ], a
quantity that can be observed in the market at time t provided there is a rich
enough supply of zero coupon bonds with different maturities. Notice that
in the rather simple situation of equation (7), this yield would be decreasing
in T if g(·) is a decreasing function, ceteris paribus.
The precautionary effect is positive since our representative agent is pru-
dent. What this means is the following: If future uncertainty increases, so
that σ(t) is increasing in t, the future interest rate will go down, all else
equal. If this is the case, the yield curve is a decreasing function of T . In the
canonical model given in (1) these two effects exactly cancel, giving a flat
yield curve.
Constant yield curves are usually not observed in real markets. Most
of the time the yield curve is increasing, compensating long term investors.
This compensation can, perhaps, be partly interpreted as a liquidity pre-
mium. From 1900 to date there has only been seven periods with falling, or
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”inverted” yield curves, and in six of these cases this period was followed by
a recession. The interest rates are then in nominal terms, while r is otherwise
the real rate in this paper.
This behavior is an indication that the information about the yield curve
is of importance for the market of risky investments, and hence for the real
economy as well.
3 Adverse shocks to the economy
In this section we limit the discussion to the possibilities of obtaining an
equilibrium interest rate of around 1.4 per cent in the standard model (1),
or perhaps (6), as was suggested in the Stern report.
The yearly standard deviation σ of consumption growths (nondurables
and services) over the last 100 years or so has been estimated to around
3.57%, consistent with the estimate of Mehra and Prescott (1985), and later
updates. Unlike Stern, however, we insist on using standard values for the
parameters regarding the preferences, that is, we assume that ρ ≈ .01 and
γ ≈ 2 in the paper. 5
Two key parameters in the standard exchange model of Lucas (1987) are
then the future growth rate, and the future standard deviation of the growth
rate of aggregate consumption of nondurables and services. One may ar-
gue that climate problems are particularly difficult to quantify, because of
damages caused by non-linear meteorological phenomena that are only par-
tially understood. Figure 6-5c of the Review shows the increasing damages
of climate change on a ”business as usual” policy. By year 2200, the losses
in GNP have an expected value of 13.8% of what GNP would be otherwise,
with a .05 percentile of about 3% and a .95 percentile of about 34%. If we let
ct represent the value at a future time t of aggregate consumption
6 with no
greenhouse gas emissions, and cet the corresponding quantity with greenhouse
gas emissions and no mitigation, the above statement means in quantitative
terms that if we define
Xt :=
(ct − cet)
ct
)
100%,
then P (Xt < 3) = .05, P (Xt > 34) = .05 and E(Xt) = 13.8. The base rate
of growth of the economy, before calculating the climate change effects, was
taken to be 1.3% per year.
5In Sections 4 we use logarithmic utility, but then there are no restriction on the
subjective rate ρ.
6For simplicity we assume that GNP and aggregate consumption of nondurables and
services are proportional in this argument.
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If we apply the modeling framework given above, which is based on nor-
mally distributed random shocks, we obtain that this kind of uncertainty
about the future translates into g = .0130, ge = .0119, and σe = .0366. The
latter is to be compared to σ = .0357. In other words, the benefits from
mitigating greenhouse gas emissions can be represented as an increase in the
annual growth rate from today to 2200 from 1.19% to 1.3%, with a corre-
sponding decline in annual standard deviation from 3.66% to 3.57%. We
have to compare this benefit with the cost of stabilization.
The effect on the interest rate given in (1) from this drop in standard
deviation is not enough to obtain the desired low value of r. The interest
rate with no emissions would be 3.22% with the above parameter values,
whereas the corresponding interest rate with emissions and no mitigation is
3%.
We think it is reason to reconsider a constant yearly standard deviation
of the growth rate in consumption for the next 200 years of the order of 3.7%.
This estimate is the historic one, based on data from about the last 100 years.
In the above calculations we have used that a yearly standard deviation of σ
leads to a standard deviation of
√
tσ at time t years from now, so the future
uncertainty automatically increases with a constant σ. Making the volatility
parameter σ in addition an increasing function of time, seems as ’gilding the
lily’. However, if the future uncertainty is not revealed gradually, but more
at later stages, a time varying volatility could be appropriate.
This is likely to be the case here, since the time horizon is twice as long
as the one the historic estimate is based on, combined with our present lack
of a proper understanding the consequences of aggregated human activity,
as well as other natural phenomena.
What size of uncertainty is required in the standard model to account for a
low enough interest rate? A numerical example will illustrate. If by year 2200
the losses in consumption have an expected value of 52% of what consumption
would be otherwise, with a .05 percentile of about 2% and a .95 percentile
of about 99%, this is consistent with a growth rate ge = .008 and a standard
deviation σe = .0655. This would eventually bring the yearly interest rate
down to 1.3%. However, this implies much more future uncertainty than
considered in the Review.
Increasing the uncertainty only through an increased standard deviation
is a bit vague. Instead we suggest to include possible jumps in aggregate con-
sumption at random points in time, in addition to the normally distributed
infinitesimal shocks of the standard model. Assuming that the frequency
of these jumps are λ per year and the jump sizes Zn in per cent of aggre-
gate consumption are independent with the same probability distribution, we
have the following expression for the equilibrium interest rate (Aase (1993a-b,
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2007)
r = ρ+ γ
(
g − 1
2
(1 + γ)σ2
)− λ(γE(Z) + E(1 + Z)−γ − 1). (10)
The last term is the influence on the interest rate from the random shocks
to the growth in GNP. For the present purposes, we use a Taylor series
approximation to obtain
r = ρ+ γg− 1
2
γ(1+ γ)
(
σ2+ λE(Z2)
)
+
1
6
γ(γ+1)(γ+2)λE(Z3) + · · · (11)
In this expression, the term σ2 + λE(Z2) is the new variance rate of the
growth rate, and the last term measures the additional, higher order effects
on the equilibrium interest rate from introducing non-Gaussian ”disasters”.
As a numerical illustration, assume there is between 2 and 3 disasters every
100 years, each one bringing down the aggregate output by 34%. This would
bring the interest rate down to r = .017 or 1.7% interest, which is comparable
to the Stern report. Here we have a total standard deviation rate of 6.5%, but
now we at least know where the additional uncertainty comes from. Barro
(2006) and also Rietz (1988) have considered jumps from an applied point
of view. The above parameter estimates are consistent with the numbers
presented in Barro (2006), based on data for about the last 100 years.
In isolation higher uncertainty brings down the equilibrium risk-free in-
terest rate r(t), but as we shall see in Section 5, it increases the risk premium
on investments having an uncertain outcome.
4 Term Structure Models
Related to a time changing interest rate, there is a theory in financial eco-
nomics, often referred to as the Theory of Fixed Income, that partly deals
with these issues. It has been observed that there may be risk premiums
associated with government bonds. Even if we disregard any risk associ-
ated with the final payments, meaning there is only a very low probability
that a sovereign nation will fail on its debt issues, still the interest rate is a
stochastic process, meaning that the price of a zero coupon bond will also
vary randomly, consistent with the formula (8). It would not be surprising
if this uncertainty leads to a risk premium for holding bonds, but this does
not follow from the above theory, which is consistent only with the ’pure
expectation hypothesis’.
We now turn to models that allow for such risk premiums. More impor-
tantly, as noted by several researchers, the interest rate r in the distant future
13
involve considerable amounts of uncertainty. For example is it an important
point in Weizman (1998) that this uncertainty is transfered to the discount
factor at a future point in time. It is the discount factors at different future
time points which are relevant in a cost-benefit analysis, and since this factor
is a non-linear function of the interest rate, we can not account for the un-
certainty by just replacing the uncertain interest rate by the expected rate.
In term structure models, this problem is partly resolved in an elegant way,
but only for future time points where there exist government bonds, which
means about 30 years into the future, at the maximum.
The models can be both of the equilibrium type as we have seen above,
or of the so called ”no arbitrage” type. The latter will be of less interest to
us, since there is no clear connection between the growth of the economy and
the interest rate.
In general the price of a zero coupon bond can be expressed as
Λt,T = E
Q
t
(
e−
R T
t r(s)ds
)
. (12)
Formally this looks like the expression in (8) but with one notable exception:
The conditional expectation is taken with respect to a risk adjusted proba-
bility measure Q instead of the given P . The connection between the two
probability measures goes through the market price of risk process ηt. If this
quantity is identically equal to zero, then P = Q. 7
In addition to the spot interest rate r(t), this theory is also concerned
with future interest rates that can be locked in today, called forward rates,
or long interest rates. They are defined by the identity
R(t, T ) =
1
T − t
∫ T
t
f(t, u)du, (13)
where f(t, u) is interpreted as the rate of return at the future date u ≤ T ,
that can be locked in at the present date t, on risk free investments. Provided
there are zero coupon bonds maturing at all dates between t and T , these
forward rates are observable in the market at each time t. The instantaneous
forward rate can also be expressed by the price Λt,T of a zero coupon bond
as follows
f(t, T ) = −∂ ln(Λt,T )
∂T
, f(t, t) = rt.
Next we turn to an equilibrium model of term structure of interest rates.
7Here dQ/dP = ξT , i.e., Q(B) =
∫
B
ξT (ω)dP (ω) for any event B, where the density
process ξt = Et(ξT ), and ξt = exp{−
∫ t
0
ηsdBs − 12
∫ t
0
ηs · ηsds}. Under Q the discounted
bond prices are martingales. The state price pit = ξte−
R t
0 r(s)ds.
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4.1 An equilibrium term structure model with produc-
tion
The Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985b) term structure theory is an impor-
tant contribution to asset pricing theory for a variety of reasons. The term
structure of interest rates, or prices of default-free zero coupon bonds, is
an important piece of information in financial markets. The term structure
embodies the expectations of the market about future events and decisions
worth billions of dollars made every day based on it.
Prior to the CIR, there were many hypotheses about the term structure.
But they were only that: Hypotheses. Phenomena like liquidity preference,
preference habitat or expectations hypotheses were proposed to explain how
the term structure behaves. The CIR model is the first theory, a consistent
set of results, that describes the term structure. Like Vasicek (1977), CIR
also get closed form solutions, which makes the theory testable.
Before we present this model, recall the following situation describing
how much a nation should save. Consider an economy developing over time
where K = Kt denotes the capital stock, c = ct consumption and Z = Zt
net national product at time t, where Z = f(K) denotes the production
function. For each t we have the national accounting identity
K˙t = f(Kt)− ct
which means that production, f(Kt), is divided between consumption, ct, and
investment, K˙t := dKt/dt. The problem is to find the optimal investment,
or equivalently, the optimal consumption, that solves
sup
c
E
[ ∫ T
0
u(ct, t) dt
]
. (14)
In their theory for the term structure of interest rates, Cox-Ingersoll-Ross
(1985) assume that the rate of growth of capital stock in a given, linear
production technology is determined by a ”random shock”, or state variable
process Y satisfying
dYt = (bY − κYt)dt+ σY
√
YtdB; Y0 > 0, t ≥ 0, (15)
where bY , κ and σY are strictly positive scalars with 2bY > σ
2
Y , and where B
is a standard Brownian motion. The capital stock process K is then assumed
to be of the form
dKt = (µKYtKt − ct)dt+ σKKt
√
YtdBt; K0 > 0, (16)
15
where µK and σK are strictly positive scalars with µK > σ
2
K . We may think
of Y as a ”shock” process that affects the productivity of capital.
The objective is to solve (14) subject to the dynamic constraints (15) and
(16), when u(x, t) = log(x)e−ρt, i.e., the objective is as in sections 1 - 3, only
with γ = 1 instead of a general γ.
The first order conditions for this problem is given by the Bellman equa-
tion, and the solution for the optimal consumption is found to be
ct =
ρKt
1− e−ρ(T−t) , t ∈ [0, T ]. (17)
Assuming that the aggregate consumption process in society follows (17), we
can now utilize the results of the standard Lucas type fruit tree exchange
economy in order to find prices; here the state price deflator pit = e
−ρt/ct.
With the aid of Itoˆ’s Formula, we get
dpit = (σ
2
K − µK)Ytpitdt− pitσK
√
YtdBt. (18)
The short rate process r is given as
rt = −µpi(t)
pit
= (µK − σ2K)Yt.
Since drt = (µK − σ2K)dYt, we find that the (endogenous) dynamics for the
short rate is
drt = κ(r
∗ − rt)dt+ σr√rtdBt, (19)
where r∗ = bY (µK−σ2K)/κ and σr = σY
√
µK − σ2K . As for the Vasicek model,
we obtain here a mean reverting interest rate process, reverting towards r∗.
Here the spot rate rt > 0 for all t, and its expectation satisfies
E(rt) = r
∗ + (r0 − r∗)e−κt.
Thus, E(rt) → r∗ exponentially with t, and r∗ is the long-run mean of the
short rate process. Likewise we can also show that the conditional expected
value of rs given the information available at time t, where s > t, is given by
Et(rs) = r
∗ + (rt − r∗)e−κ(s−t) almost surely.
The market price of risk process ηt =
σK√
µK−σ2K
√
rt, which is only equal to
zero if there is no volatility in the capital stock process Kt.
The term structure of interest rates can be solved, and the results are the
following, for any time τ < T :
Λt,τ = E
Q
t
(
e−
R τ
t rsds
)
= A(t, τ)e−B(t,τ)rt ,
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where
A(t, τ) =
( 2γ1eγ2(τ−t)/2
γ2(eγ1(τ−t) − 1) + 2γ1
) 2κr∗
σ2r
and
B(t, τ) =
( 2γ1eγ2(τ−t)/2 − 1
γ2(eγ1(τ−t) − 1) + 2γ1
)
,
and the constants γ1 and γ2 are given by
γ1 =
√
(κ+ σY σK)2 + 2σ2r ,
and
γ2 = γ1 + κ+ σY σK .
The long run average interest rate is given by
R(∞) := lim
τ→∞
R(t, τ) =
2r∗
1 + σY σK
κ
+
√
(1 + σY σK
κ
)2 + 2
(
σr
κ
)2 . (20)
Also, the slope of the yield curve can be determined:
• If rt ≤ κr∗γ1+κ+σY σK , then ∂R∂τ > 0, we have an upward sloping yield curve;
• If κr∗
γ1+κ+σY σK
< rt ≤ κr∗κ+σY σK , then we get a humped yield curve;
• If κr∗
κ+σY σK
< rt, then
∂R
∂τ
< 0, the yield curve is downward sloping.
4.2 The connection to the growth rate of the economy
We want to establish a connection between the conditional growth rate of the
economy and long term interest rates, and compare to the results of sections
1-3 of the paper. To our knowledge, these results are new in the literature.
There may be a good reason why seasonality, or business cycles, are not
found of interest in climate problems. It is not the cycles per se that interest
us. Rather it is the ergodic nature of the economy - it allows for a long term
perspective, and the fact that consumption is endogenous.
Recall that in the sections 1-3 the growth rate was denoted by g, and its
relation to the spot interest rate r was given by equations (1), (6), (10) or
(11), depending upon circumstances.
To start, we derive the dynamics of the optimal, aggregate consumption
given in (17). By Itoˆ’s Formula it follows that
dct = µc(t)dt+ σc(t)dBt (21)
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where the drift term is
µc(t) =
ρ
1− e−ρ(T−t)
((
µKYt − ρe
−ρ(T−t)
1− e−ρ(T−t)
)
Kt − ct
)
,
and the diffusion term is
σc(t) =
ρ
1− e−ρ(T−t)KtσK
√
Yt.
The conditional expected growth rate µc(t)/ct of the aggregate consumption
process at time t is by definition
µc(t)
ct
:=
d
du
Et
(cu
ct
)
|u=t =
(
µKYt − ρe
−ρ(T−t)
1− e−ρ(T−t) − 1
)
,
where we have used (17) in the above expression for µc(t). From the dynamics
of the state variable Y given in (15) it follows that for s > t
Et(Ys) =
bY
κ
+ (Yt − bY
κ
)e−κ(s−t) and E(Yt) =
bY
κ
+ (Y0 − bY
κ
)e−κt.
Let us use the notation g(t) := µc(t)/ct, and g¯t := E(g(t)). We conclude that
g¯t := µK
(bY
κ
+ (Y0 − bY
κ
)e−κt
)
− ρe
−ρ(T−t)
1− e−ρ(T−t) − 1. (22)
Equation (22) gives a connection between the mean growth rate of the aggre-
gate consumption process and the other parameters of the present production
economy.
Related to climate problems discussed in sections 1-3, it is of interest to
look at very long term relationships, which we here can do by first letting the
time horizon T grow, then increasing t from its origin. T plays the role of
the ”end of the world” in this model, as can be seen from the equation (17)
for the optimal consumption process: As t approaches T , the consumption
rate goes to infinity. As T →∞ we see that
g¯t = µK
(bY
κ
+ (Y0 − bY
κ
)e−κt
)
− 1. (23)
Notice the transient nature of the subjective interest rate ρ is this relation-
ship; at long horizons the effect from ρ disappears. In the Stern Review it
has been argued that ρ = 0 in climate related problems since it is difficult to
give any good ethical arguments for treating the generations differently just
based on the fact that they are borne at different points in time. Provided
one accepts this argument, and at the same time individuals have a relatively
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high ρ in their evaluations of own consumption during their life time, this
could be used as an argument for a lower long term interest rate than short
term rate.
Recall that r∗ is the long-run mean of the short rate process, where r∗ =
bY (µK−σ2K)/κ. By letting t grow in (23), we get a direct connection between
the long-run mean growth rate g¯ of aggregate consumption and the long-run
short rate r∗ as follows
r∗ = (g¯ + 1)
(
1− σ
2
K
µK
)
. (24)
Note that t can either be interpreted as the present, where t is large relative
to the origin 0, which we could take to be around, say, 1900 for the data that
we have in mind, or the present could be 0 and t some distant future point
in time, less than 200 years from now.
This relationship is of a different nature than the connection between
r and g in (1), as is (22), but is of interest in the present setting: Since
µK > σ
2
K , the factor (1− σ
2
K
µK
) < 1, and the long-run mean short rate may be
small. For example if the uncertainty in the capital stock is large relative to
the expected growth of the capital stock, this will happen. Note that in such a
situation σr will be small, so the the spot rate uncertainty is then low, and the
short term interest rate is close to constant. In other words, this production
economy allows the equilibrium long-run short rate to be relatively low, even
if the long-run mean growth rate in aggregate consumption is relatively high.
Recall that we now have a production economy, which also involves in-
vestments. The growth rate in consumption is g(t), and we must in addition
take into account the investments in order to obtain the overall growth rate
in GNP.
To this end, consider the conditional expected growth rate of the net
national product of the economy. Denoting this quantity by h(t), it is given
by
h(t) :=
d
du
Et
( 1
Kt
∫ u
t
(dKs + csds)
)
|u=t. (25)
Note that this definition takes into account both consumption growth and
growth in investment. From the dynamics of the capital stock in (16) it
follows that
h(t) = µKYt.
From the dynamics of the shock process Y it follows that for s > t
Et(h(s)) = µK
(bY
κ
+ (Yt − bY
κ
)e−κ(s−t)
)
,
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and from this it we deduce that
Et(h(s))→ µK bY
κ
:= h¯ as s→∞,
where h¯ is the long-run mean growth rate of the net national product. Ac-
cordingly
r∗ = h¯− bY σ
2
K
κ
. (26)
This relationship gives an equilibrium connection between the long-run short
rate r∗ and and the long-run mean growth rate h¯ of the net national product.
For example, since bY > 0 and κ > 0, it is clear that r
∗ < h¯. The Stern
Review indicates the number h¯ = 0.012, or a 1.2% growth rate during the
next 200 years with no mitigation. This allows for a long-run interest rate
smaller that 1.2%, which is of the same order of magnitude as the 1.4%
proposed by Stern.
The comparison with the analysis in sections 2 and 3 is not entirely fair,
since we here have a representative agent with relative risk aversion γ = 1.
In Section 3 we claimed that the interest rate is 3.22% with no emissions,
using γ = 2. The corresponding number with γ = 1 is 2.17%, using the other
parameter values in Section 3. So, after adjusting for the discrepancies in
risk aversion, the present theory can still explain smaller long-run equilibrium
interest rates for any given growth rate of GNP.
We can also find an equilibrium connection between R(t, T ) and the av-
erage mean growth rate of GNP over the period (t, T ) defined by
1
T − t
∫ T
t
Et
(
h(s)
)
ds.
It is seen that this quantity equals
µK
bY
κ
+
(
Yt − bY
κ
)1− e−κ(T−t)
(T − t)κ .
When the horizon T grows, it follows that
1
T − t
∫ T
t
Et
(
h(s)
)
ds→ µK bY
κ
:= h¯∞, as (T − t)→∞.
From the above we note that h¯∞ = h¯, and from the expression for the long
run average interest rate R(∞) in (20), we find that
R(∞) = 2
(
h¯∞ − σ
2
KbY
κ
)
1 + σY σK
κ
+ γ1
κ
. (27)
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Again, there is nothing pathological in having a low average interest rate,
that is, averaged from the present to the distant future, even if the long-run,
averaged mean growth rate of the net national product is relatively high,
provided the uncertainty in the capital stock is large enough.
From the parameter restriction 2bY > σ
2
Y the following inequalities hold:
R(∞) < 2h¯∞ −
σ2Kσ
2
Y
κ
1 + σY σK
κ
+ γ1
κ
and r∗ < h¯− 1
2
σ2Y σ
2
K
κ
. (28)
Although formally different from the model of the equilibrium interest rate
of Section 1, the two models have many similar features, as is to be expected.
For example, precautionary savings was seen to have a decreasing effect on
the interest rate, so that when uncertainty of the growth rate in aggregate
consumption increases, r decreases.
A similar pattern is seen to take place in the present model, now related to
an increase in the uncertainty of the capital stock and in the shock process
Y . From (28) we notice that when the product σ2Kσ
2
Y increases, then the
interest decreases. Also, when κ increases, i.e., when the force by which mean
reversion takes place is intensified, both the interest rates in (28) increase.
Note that the representative agent of the present section is also prudent, so
precautionary savings ought to take place in some form or the other.
The present model for the term structure can be embedded in a stock-
market equilibrium with decentralized production decisions. In this equilib-
rium ct of equation (17) is the optimal real output rate process of a firm
controlling the capital stock production process and maximizing its share
price S(t). This stock price can be shown to be equal to Kt, and from the
expressions for µc(t) and σc(t) in the dynamic equation (21) for consumption,
we notice that the consumption process with this reinterpretation depends
on investments in equity.
For projects that are correlated with equity, or more precisely with ag-
gregate consumption, the proper discount factor should be adjusted for risk.
This is the topic to which we now turn.
5 Risk premiums
When projects have uncertain returns, the situation is no longer so simple.
There is, for example, no ”term structure” for such projects, since this de-
pends on risk-free payments in the future. In Section 2 we suggested that
the risk premium of any risky asset is given by equation (4). Below we shall
return to this relationship.
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We start by discussing a model for the equilibrium asset prices. If Q is a
risk adjusted probability measure, then the price today, St, of a risky security
is given by the formula
St = E
Q
t
[
exp
(− ∫ T
t
rudu
)
ST +
∫ T
t
exp
(− ∫ s
t
rudu
)
dDs
]
. (29)
Here D is the dividend process of the security, and r the short rate. The
connection between the state prices pit and the risk adjusted probability Q
goes through the discounted density process as follows: pit = ξte
− R t0 rudu where
ξt = Et(ξT ) and
dQ
dP
= ξT .
Provided the dividends can be represented as a rate, i.e., Dt =
∫ t
0
δsds,
the present value can be expressed in term of the state prices under the given
probability measure P as follows:
St =
1
pit
Et
[
piTST +
∫ T
t
pisdDs
]
, (30)
with dDs replaced by (dDs−σD(s)ηsds), where η is the market-price-of-risk,
if the dividends are modeled by an Itoˆ-process with a non-zero diffusion σD.
Under certain circumstances it is possible to find risk adjusted returns
in each period as functions of primitives at time t, but the conditions are of
course strict. If the project has a long time horizon, it is more demanding
to find the relevant required returns over the entire future period. Provided
the state prices are known today, and their future evolution has a known
probability distribution, and if all joint distributions dictated by (29) are
known, then it should be possible to find the correct discount factors in
all future time periods as seen from today, but one cannot expect simple
formulas.
The most popular approach is given by the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM) developed in the mid 1960’s by Mossin, Lindtner and Sharpe. This
is a one-period model which gives the difference between the expected return
E(Rj) of a risky security j and the risk-less rate r in terms of the expected
return on the market portfolio E(Rm) as follows
ERj − r = βj,m(ERm − r) j = 1, 2, · · · , N, (31)
for each of N risky securities, where
βj,m = cov(Rj, Rm)/var(Rm).
Thus the risk premium of asset j is proportional to the risk premium of
the market portfolio. Since the constant of proportionality βj,m can also
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be interpreted as a regression coefficient, the model invites for time series
estimates of this parameter for each risky security.
However, this very methodology presumes that the model is valid in a
multiperiod setting. If the conditions are strong for the one period CAPM
to hold, they are considerably stronger for this to be true in several peri-
ods. The problem is that while in the one period model final wealth equals
consumption, in many periods one must also consider investments. Suppose
there is a state variable Y = Yt, a vector of random variables observable at
each time t. Assuming that Y is a Markov process, an approximate ”multi-
beta” model can be derived in a discrete time framework, that in some sense
generalizes the single period CAPM. However, only when the state variable
Y (1), Y (2), · · · , Y (T ) is a sequence of independent random variables will the
multiperiod problem be transformed into a sequence of disconnected single
period problems, and a conditional CAPM will hold period by period, in
which the rate of return on the market portfolio is the pivotal variable.
In a continuous-time framework an exact multi-beta asset pricing relation
has been developed by Merton (1973), the Intertemporal Capital Asset Pric-
ing Model (ICAPM), in which case a stochastic investment opportunity set
is allowed. Because the state variables are generic, the model is robust in the
sense that it can capture investors’ desires to hedge against other economic
events in addition to shifts in the investment opportunity set. To either test
or apply the model requires, of course, that the relevant state variables of
the environment can be identified.
One approach to solving this identification problem is the purely empirical
one, generally associated with the application of the Ross’ (1976) Arbitrage
Pricing Theory. From the derived specification of asset-return dynamics, fac-
tor analysis can be applied directly to the historical time series of returns to
calculate the ”implied” state variables of the environment. An alternative
approach is to specify the state variables from a priori theoretical reasoning.
A particularly imaginative and fundamental contribution to this theoreti-
cal approach is Breeden’s (1979) Consumption-Based Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CCAPM), to which we return below.
When there are no state variables, Merton’s (1973) version of the ICAPM
can be considered a continuous-time version of the ordinary CAPM of equa-
tion (31): The risk premiums are given by
µi − r = βi,m(µm − r) (32)
where
βi,m =
cov(dSi
Si
, drm)
cov(drm, drm)
.
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The assumptions are, among others, that the security prices Si are all log-
normally distributed equilibrium prices, where µi is the drift rate of the
cumulative-return process Ri(t) defined by dRi(t) = dSi(t)/Si(t), drm is the
instantaneous return on the value weighted market portfolio, and µm is the
expected instantaneous return on the market portfolio.
For the one-period CAPM, it is evident from Mossin (1966) that prices
are assumed to be in equilibrium in his exposition. Sufficient conditions for
equilibrium to exist for this model was only given as late as in 1990 (see
Nielsen (1990)).
5.1 The Consumption-Based Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CCAPM)
We are particularly interested in risk premiums in times of crises, like the
current financial turmoil of 2008 and onwards, and would also like to add
some comments to risk premiums for the long run, related to our discussion
of climate change in sections 1-3.
In a continuous-time framework, assume processes of interest are Itoˆ-
processes, so that, for example, the price of a risky security is a strictly
positive process of the form
dSt = µS(t)dt+ σS(t)dBt.
We define the cumulative-return process R by dRt = dSt/St, having expected
return rate µR(t) and volatility σR(t). Starting with a pure no-arbitrage
restriction on expected returns, provided there exists a state price deflator
pi meaning that deflated prices Spi(t) = Stpit are martingales, the martingale
property immediately gives the relationship for the risk premium
µR(t)− rt = − 1
pit
σR(t) · σpi(t). (33)
In an equilibrium of the type described in the first part of the paper, the state
price deflator pit = u
′(ct, t). Supposing the aggregate consumption satisfies
the exogenous dynamics
dct = ctµc(t)dt+ ctσc(t)dBt,
an application of Itoˆ’s formula gives that
σpi(t) = u
′′(ct, t)ctσc(t),
Using the no-arbitrage restriction (33), we immediately obtain the CCAPM:
µR(t)− rt = γ(t)σR(t) · σc(t). (34)
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where
γ(t) = −u
′′(ct, t)ct
u′(ct, t)
,
i.e., γ(t) is the intertemporal coefficient of relative risk aversion of the rep-
resentative consumer. We indicated this relationship already in equation (4)
of Section 2. When this consumer has the additive and separable utility
function
U(c) = E
{∫ T
0
e−
R t
0 ρ(s)dsu(ct)dt
}
,
the equilibrium representation for the interest rate is from (3)
rt = ρ(t) + γ(t)µc(t)− 1
2
u′′′(ct)c2t
u′(ct)
σc(t) · σc(t). (35)
We notice from (34) that higher consumption uncertainty measured by σc
leads to higher risk premiums and a smaller interest rate, all else equal.
These two relationships have in principle been tested on the data of the
previous century by Mehra and Prescott (1985), also followed by many oth-
ers, and the empirical performance is mixed. Many possible explanations
have been put forth. There may be significant indivisibilities and transac-
tions costs in consumption, and especially consumer durables8. Since the
aggregate consumption process ct involves a considerable amount of smooth-
ing, both across goods and across agents, it is unlikely that it is possible to
estimate the covariance rate term σR ·σc appearing in (34) with the required
degree of accuracy. The likelihood of measurement errors is enhanced by the
specification requirement that the observation interval between measured,
successive changes must be of short duration. Real-world asset returns are
quite volatile and exhibit little high-frequency correlation with lagged vari-
ables of any sort. Hence lagged, or smoothed estimates of ”true” aggregate
consumption can severely influence estimates of covariance between contem-
poraneous changes in consumption and asset returns. Despite many efforts,
a resolution of the empirical-performance issue for the CCAPM has remained
an open question to date (e.g., Kocherlakota (1996)).
Implied by the Mehra and Prescott (1985) study, there is a risk free rate
of 0.80% annually. This estimate has been found to be too low by other
researchers, like Siegel (1992). Seen in light of the Stern Review’s 1.4%
however, this low estimate should be regarded as promising, and one may
wonder why it has not simply been adopted in the Review. One reason
could be that Mehra and Prescott also found a premium on equity to be
8The fruit-tree economy of Lucas (1978) assumes the consumption good to be non-
durable and services, also including the nondurable parts of durables.
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6% during the period. Since all investments with a time horizon of about
200 years are necessarily risky, this could mean no good news for mitigation
today. However, this depends on the nature of the project, as we shall discuss
below. Another reason may be that researchers simply do not believe in a
risk free rate of 0.80% for the last century. This we also return to below.
The above observations lead directly to the Equity Premium Puzzle: In
order for (34) to explain such a high risk premium on equity, the covariance
between equity and aggregate consumption increases must be relatively large.
For reasonable values of the risk aversion γ, the model does not appear to fit
the data.
In the same vein, since the estimate of the variance of consumption in-
creases is so low, the last term in (35) becomes too small in absolute value
to explain the low risk-free rate at an annual growth rate in aggregate con-
sumption of about 1.8%. In order to fit this equation, the subjective rate ρ
becomes negative, which is nonsense. This is related to the Risk-Free Rate
Puzzle (Weil (1989)). Solved together with the standard estimates, one ob-
tains γˆ = 10.2 and ρˆ = −.10 as a ”method of moment estimates” for the
parameters γ and ρ.
In an interview in 2008, Ranish Mehra, one of the two authors of the
seminal 1985-article, suggests a reasonable risk premium on equity to be
about one percent in the future. In this case, both puzzles would disappear.
McGrattan and Prescott (2003) re-examine the equity premium puzzle,
taking into account some factors ignored by the Mehra and Prescott: Taxes,
regulatory constraints, and diversification costs - and focus on long-term
rather than short-term savings instruments. Accounting for these factors,
the authors find that the difference between average equity and debt returns
during peacetime in the last century is less than one per cent, with the
average real equity return somewhat under five per cent, and the average
real debt return almost four per cent.
In a recent paper Aase (2011) employs a production model instead of the
standard pure exchange model to study these issues: If investors follow the
standard financial theory paradigm, the simplest linear production model
studied in that paper, similar in spirit to the model in (16), implies that they
will approach the financial market more or less in isolation from the rest of
the economy. With a relative risk aversion close to two, a risk premium of
around six per cent will automatically emerge from such an approach with a
market volatility of 17 per cent. In its turn this leads to an equilibrium short
rate of 0.80 per cent. However, the linear model implies that the volatility
of the consumption growths is the same as the volatility of return on equity.
With a non-linear production model, on the other hand, possibly including
capital and labor as state variables, the investors are invited to hedge against
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unfavorable changes in the state variables as well. When these effects are
taken into account, one interpretation is that the stock market of the last
century may have been perceived to be more risky than it really was. This is
so since also in the more general production model the CCAPM also holds.
Notice that this approach takes the market volatility as given.
Let us return to the question of how the risk premium behaves in times
of ”turbulence”.
5.2 Will risk premiums increase when consumption
uncertainty increases?
To answer this question, let us assume there exists an asset, having return
process R∗, with the property that its variance rate σ∗(t) = k(t)σc(t) for some
strictly positive, real valued process k. This asset has accordingly a perfect
instantaneous correlation with aggregate consumption. The CCAPM gives
for this asset
µ∗(t)− rt = γ(t)σ∗(t) · σc(t) = γ(t)k(t)σc(t) · σc(t)
Now define the ”beta” of any risky security with this particular asset as
follows
βR,R∗(t) =
σR(t) · σ∗(t)
σ∗(t) · σ∗(t) .
The CCAPM then takes the form
µR(t)− rt = βR,R∗(t)(µ∗(t)− rt), (36)
for any risky security with return rate process R(t). Now recall that β mea-
sures risk within a market, and βR∗,R∗(t) = 1 for all t. In turbulent times,
some firms’ betas may increase, and others may decrease, but by and large
the betas do not systematically change on average, simply by construction.
However, the risk premium (µ∗(t) − rt) is seen to increase when the vari-
ance rate of aggregate consumption increases. Thus, when the uncertainty
in aggregate consumption increases, most risk premiums will increase.
This could be consistent with many different scenarios, one being that
prices will fall, which is what happened in 2008. Similarly the model predicts
that the equilibrium interest rate will fall, as is evident from the expression
in (35) for a prudent representative consumer (u′′′ > 0). One strength with
this model is that it links the financial economy with aggregate consumption
in a simple and direct manner.
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6 Adverse shocks to the economy and the
risk premium
As with the interest rate, there is a corresponding CCAPM when there are
sudden shocks in the exogenous variables. When the same underlying shocks
generate jumps in both equilibrium asset prices and aggregate consumption,
the risk premium analogue of equation (33) is (Aase 1993a-b, 2007)
µR(t)− rt = − 1
pit
(
σR(t) · σpi(t) +
∫
Z
γpi(t, z)γR(t, z)λdF (z)
)
. (37)
The last term stems from the jumps, with ”internal” shocks having values in a
set Z with cumulative distribution function F (z), and frequency λ, and where
γpi(t, z) is the jump size in the state price deflator, γR(t, z) the corresponding
shock in the equilibrium return of a risky asset, when the shocks in the
aggregate consumption are γc(t, z). The analogue of the CCAPM in (34) is
µR(t)− rt = γ(t)σR(t) · σc(t)
−
∫
Z
(
u′(ct−(1 + γc(t, z)), t)− u′(ct−, t)
u′(ct, t
)
γR(t, z)λdF (z).
(38)
In order to se how the sudden shocks may influence risk premiums, let us
expand in a Taylor series. The result is
µR(t)− rt = γ(t)
(
σR(t) · σc(t) +
∫
Z
γc(t, z)γR(t, z)λdF (z)
)
− 1
2
(u′′′(ct, t)c2t
u′(ct, t)
)∫
Z
γc(t, z)
2γR(t, z)λdF (z) + · · ·
(39)
The shocks in the price St of a risky asset are negative when the quantity
γR(t, z) is negative. Thus, in times of turmoil the quantities γc(t, z) and
γR(t, z) both negative at the same time. The second term on the right-hand
side of (39) will be positive in this case, and, since for a prudent representative
agent the third derivative of the utility index is positive, the third term on
the right-hand side is also positive. This means that the risk premium will
increase in times of economic crises, consistent with the arguments of the
previous section.
Related to the Equity Premium Puzzle, the second term on the right-
hand side will have to be calibrated to the data, but the third term will
yield a positive contribution to the risk premium provided only disasters are
modeled by the jump term, as we have just seen. Thus the introduction of
jumps in the stochastic models may help explain higher risk premiums.
28
Regarding the Risk Free Rate Puzzle, consider equation (11) for the equi-
librium interest rate. The third term on the right-hand side is the variance
rate of the aggregate consumption increases, and will have to be calibrated
to the data. However, considering only the possibility of negative shocks to
aggregate consumption, the fourth term is accordingly negative, helping to
get the subjective rate ρ in the right direction in this regard.
With the US-data of Mehra and Prescott (1985) in mind, we have been
able to calibrate the parameters γ and ρ to a pure jump model of the kind
just described to the following sizes: γˆ = 5.1 and ρˆ = −.05, which is, of
course, better that the continuous model can manage alone, but still not
satisfactory. The results are in general better for the risk aversion parameter
than for the subjective interest rate. As suggested above, however, Aase
(2011) has a different explanation for these two puzzles.
7 Discounting and mitigation
We have argued that, with a relative risk aversion around two and a sub-
jective rate of ρ = 0.01 for the representative consumer, the standard model
demands an equity premium of about one per cent and a short term inter-
est rate of around four per cent for the consumption and equity moment
estimates used by Mehra and Prescott (1985). This value for the risk free
interest rate is consistent with Nordhaus (2008), and also with McGrattan
and Prescott (2003).
A declining equity premium has been observed in the 1990s, and Lettau
et. al. (2008) attributes this to lower macroeconomic volatility and high
asset prices in this period. It will be interesting to see how the risk premiums
develop in the future.
With respect to climate problems, imagine a project whose return is neg-
atively correlated with aggregate consumption. It follows from the CCAPM
that such a project is associated with a negative risk premium in equilibrium.
The resulting rate for such a project would be lower than the risk free rate
rt. In other words, while a project that contributes positively to aggregate
consumption is penalized with a higher discounting, a project that works as
an insurance of future consumption is ’rewarded’ by a lower discounting. In
an insurance market context, insurance benefits the one who owns insurance
in the bad state, at the expense of those ’issuing’ insurance. Such an in-
terpretation is, however, not fruitful when it comes to insuring society as a
whole.
Normally it is difficult to get private entrepreneurs to invest in projects
with a negative expected rate of return. Individuals, however, buy insurance
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products with precisely this property. ’Projects’ with counter-cyclical payoff
structure in the aggregate, as national defense, are more naturally relegated
to the public sector. According to the mutuality principle, everyone will op-
timally hold increasing functions of the aggregate consumption. Abatements
will typically have the effect of smoothing aggregate consumption, so that,
in cases where the climate is in a bad state, consumption is not as low as it
would have been without abatement. Risk averse individuals would normally
prefer such pooling over states/time.
Abatement administered by the government on behalf of the population
may possess this insurance property. On the other hand, ’abatement projects’
are not ’owned’ by some individuals at the ’expense’ of the ’issuers’ in the
bad state. Thus such projects may function as insuring the society as a
whole. Such insurance of aggregate consumption is however not transfer of
risk (as in insurance markets) and not between individuals, but reduction in
aggregate variability across states. Our theory then tells us that mitigation
can be associated with a discount rate that is lower than the risk free rate.
As an illustration, consider a situation with a growth rate of 1.3% and a
risk free rate of 3.2% as was suggested in Section 3. Considering the extreme
case where the effect from mitigation has a volatility of the order of equity,
this leads to a discount rate of around 2%. From the model of Section 4, on
the other hand, we could explain a risk free rate as low as 1.2%, which would
then imply a rather low discount rate for such projects.
We do not claim that references to all projects of mitigation are negatively
correlated with aggregate consumption. In the production economy of Aase
(2011), for example, a project can have negative correlation with some state
variables, like capital, labor or wealth, without being negatively correlated
with aggregate consumption, in which case the proper interest rate may be
close to the risk-less one.
The problem still remains that mitigation hurts the generations that carry
it out, and rewards future, yet unborn generations. The above smoothing
argument is normally valid for one individual throughout his or her lifetime,
and thus it is perfectly valid under infinitely lived generations and - if deemed
realistic - multigenerational models that retain their features. At this point
it seems appropriate to bring in an analogy to life insurance. The insurance
customer pays a premium today in exchange for a payment upon death. In
a model of life cycles, we associate this observation with a bequest motive.
Life insurance can be viewed as a financial tool for controlling inter-personal
transfers (e.g., Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers (1985)). This is obviously
one direction that could be pursued further regarding climate projects. Here
we only make the point that markets for life insurance do exist.
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8 Summary
We have studied models that connect the the financial sector to the real
economy, in order to (a) investigate the effects of sudden negative shocks to
the economy, and (b) study the economic reactions to the possible effects
of climate change. One problem of interest is under what conditions are
long-term interests lower than short term rates. The traditional model is
by and large silent about this, and ad hoc arguments are commonplace. We
introduce jump dynamics in the aggregate consumption process, which allows
us to obtain lower long term interest rates subject to negative shocks, when,
at the same time, the uncertainty in consumption growth only increases
moderately in the future. Alternatively we use a production economy that
provides an entire term structure of interest rates to answer such questions.
One result is that in the long run will the equilibrium interest rate not depend
on the subjective rate, and this model can be consistent with a fairly low long
term interest rate.
We also study what impact negative shocks in aggregate consumption
has on risk premiums. Here we consider two different continuous-time mod-
els; one with a continuous state dynamics, and one which allows for sudden
shocks at random time points. Both models predict, perhaps not surprisingly,
increased risk premiums in turbulent times.
Based on a production model, we conclude that the best estimate of the
short rate is about four per cent, with an equity premium of around one per
cent, based on historical estimates for volatilities and mean rates of equity
and aggregate consumption. If these volatilities increase in the future, this
leads to higher risk premiums, and also lower interest rates.
Our theory tells us that projects correlated with aggregate consumption
must include adjustments for this uncertainty in discounting. In particular,
for specific projects aimed at insuring future consumption, the risk premium
is typically negative, which means that the discount factors for such projects
are higher than discount factors for uncorrelated projects. It is argued that
such projects constitute the proper social insurance, which may then become
feasible from a cost/benefit perspective.
With reference to global warming, we have questioned whether the util-
itarian calculus is the right ethical framework. The ethics of the common
Norwegian farmer may be an appropriate guide: To leave the farm to the
next generation in a condition at least as good as it was received. This leads
to a rights-based notion of ethics rather than a utilitarian. With some com-
mon sense in place, and, perhaps, if supplemented with the bequest motive,
we believe the utilitarian platform is still appropriate.
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